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# CYBERSHIELD

## An Approach to Defeat Malware in Edge Computers using Hardware Diversity

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The Second IFIP Workshop on Intelligent Vehicle Dependability and Security (IVDS)

*June 23-26, 2022 – Old Town Alexandria, VA, USA*



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Professor, CS

**Colter Barney**

Grad Student, EE

**Walker Ward**

Undergrad Student, CS

**Tristan Running Crane**

Grad Student, EE




### Industry Mentor

**Dr. Jay Lala**


Cyber Tech Area Lead

Senior Principal Engineering Fellow

## Types of Cybersecurity Attacks




## Types of Cybersecurity Attacks



## Likely Malware Insertion Points in Future for Vehicles

**Vehicle Wireless Com Interfaces**




**Charging connection w/ wireless telemetry**



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
## The Malware Cybersecurity Challenge



- The nation's cyber infrastructure consists of a massive number of identical computer systems.
- This **homogeneity** is advantageous because a single piece of software can be deployed across millions of systems to increase capacity.



## The Malware Cybersecurity Challenge



- The nation's cyber infrastructure consists of millions of homogeneous computer systems.
- This **homogeneity** is advantageous because malware can be deployed across millions of systems.

However, this gives an attacker a significant advantage in terms of effort relative to system defenders by re-using their attack across numerous systems.



## The Attacker's Advantages Becomes Greater as we Move to Embedded Computing.



### Personal Computers

**400M** sold in 2018.



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### Smart Phones

**1.5B** sold in 2018.





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### Embedded Computers

**25B** sold in 2018.




If Homogeneity gives the attacker an advantage, let's diversify the network.



Take Away the Attacker's Advantage  
by Randomizing the Hardware




## But How Do You Diversify Hardware???



Hardware is fixed and takes months/years to fabricate.



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There has been some prior work in the area of randomization of instructions sets in **Virtual Machines**, with promising results.

**IT Monoculture**

### Randomized Instruction Sets and Runtime Environments

Past Research and Future Directions

Instruction set randomization offers a way to combat code-injection attacks by separating code from data (specifically, by randomizing legitimate code's execution environment). The author describes the motivation behind this approach and two application environments.



**ANGELOS D. KIKIOTIS**  
Columbia University

**C**ode-injection attacks are one of the most powerful vectors for compromising a system remotely. Attackers insert code of their choosing into a remote system and somehow induce its execution. This injected code then acts as a "beach head" through which, if undetected or otherwise unchecked, attackers can explore and use the system to their own ends. Although the remote insertion of new code into a target system can take many forms, the term *code injection* typically means that the code was surreptitiously added to an existing, running process or application (as opposed to, for example, a malicious executable received as an email attachment).

For many years, the most common method for code injection was via buffer overflow vulnerabilities. By exploiting weaknesses involving input validation and array-bounds-checking in C/C++ programs, an attacker could inject code to a remote process's address space and cause the program to code control to the injected code. In the simplest case, the return pointer of a specific function's stack frame is made to point to the injected code, causing the program to jump to the attack code upon returning from that function. More recently, different types of code-injection attacks have also started to appear, but they typically operate at a different level of abstraction and exploit completely different vulnerabilities. SQL-injection attacks, for example, involve inserting database commands into data sent to Web applications, allowing the attacker to extract or manipulate information in a Web site's back-end database. Cross-site scripting (XSS) attacks let intruders bypass modern Web browsers' security mechanisms by making their JavaScript code appear as if it were coming from a different, possibly trusted, site.

Researchers and practitioners have proposed several techniques to counter code-injection attacks, including safe languages, static code analysis tools, software hardening techniques, hardware extensions such as the No-eXecute (NX) feature in modern processors, attack detection and containment mechanisms, and so forth. One such technique is instruction set randomization (ISR). The basic idea behind this approach is that attackers don't know the language "spoken" by the runtime environment on which an application runs, so a code-injection attack will ultimately fail because the foreign code, however injected, is written in a different language. In contrast to other defense mechanisms, we can apply ISR against any type of code-injection attack, in any environment. Moreover, its use results in diversifying the runtime environment such that a successful attack against one process or host won't succeed verbatim against another. This is particularly useful in the context of self-propagating malware (such as worms), which depends on exploiting the same vulnerability in the same way across different systems, to compromise large numbers of systems.<sup>1</sup>

Naturally, we can't depend on the secrecy of the language or runtime environment for any significant time period in the presence of a determined attacker. Instead, following modern cryptography's lead, we should depend on robust algorithms for creating numerous different languages or runtime environments and then choose randomly from among them. Think of this random choice as a key: we can use it to

10 PUBLISHED BY THE IEEE COMPUTER SOCIETY ■ ISSN: 7886525X © 2008 IEEE ■ IEEE SECURITY & PRIVACY




## Our Project Focuses on Diversifying Embedded Computers, not IT Infrastructure (*i.e., Servers*)

### Characteristics of an Embedded Computer


- Smaller (sometimes 8-pin packages)
- Lower Clock Frequencies (1MHz - 16MHz)
- Smaller memories (256k to 1M)
- Dedicated software, not general-purpose
- Often no OS other than real-time scheduler.



## We Exploit the Ability to Implement a Complete Embedded Computer on a *Field Programmable Gate Array (FPGA)*



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
## Why is this important?

- *FPGA hardware is designed using a Hardware Description Language (i.e., text).*

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1 library ieee;
2 use ieee.std_logic_1164.all;
3 use ieee.numeric_std.all;
4
5 entity signed_adder is
6 port
7 (
8   aclr : in std_logic;
9   clk  : in std_logic;
10  a    : in std_logic_vector;
11  b    : in std_logic_vector;
12  q    : out std_logic_vector;
13 );
14 end signed_adder;
15
16 architecture signed_adder_arch of signed_adder is
17   signal q_s : signed(a'high+1 downto 0); -- extra bit wide
18
19 begin -- architecture
20   assert(a'length >= b'length)
21     report "Port A must be the longer vector if different sizes!"
22     severity FAILURE;
23   q <= std_logic_vector(q_s);
24
25   adding_proc:
26   process (aclr, clk)
27   begin
28     if (aclr = '1') then
29       q_s <= (others => '0');
30     elsif rising_edge(clk) then
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


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
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


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
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- *Once we have a design in an HDL, we can use scripts to create versions of it with alterations.*
- *The HDL can be created at compile-time.*



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Once we control the HDL generation, we can make modifications to the design & and even replicate it.



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## Baseline Computer

- Original Processor
- Open-Source Doc
- Known Opcodes
- Compiler Supported


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Synthesis /  
Implementation



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
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
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
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
This results in “functionally equivalent, heterogeneous cores” on the FPGA that run as a redundant system.



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The computers with randomized opcodes don't recognize the malware.

We can either throw an exception or run a pre-defined routine to remove the malware.


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7         b : in  std_logic;
8         q : out std_logic;
9     );
10 end entity signed_adder;
11
12 architecture signed_adder_arch of signed_adder is
13     signal s : signed(31 downto 0);
14     signal q : std_logic;
15
16     process
17         q <= ('0' & assigned(a)) + ('0' & assigned(b));
18         end q;
19     end process;
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5 entity signed_adder is
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7         a : in  std_logic;
8         b : in  std_logic;
9         q : out std_logic;
10     );
11 end entity signed_adder;
12
13 architecture signed_adder_arch of signed_adder is
14     signal s : signed(31 downto 0);
15     signal q : std_logic;
16
17     process
18         q <= ('0' & assigned(a)) + ('0' & assigned(b));
19         end q;
20     end process;
21 end signed_adder_arch;
```

```
library ieee;
2 use ieee.std_logic_1164.all;
3 use ieee.numeric_std.all;
4
5 entity signed_adder is
6     port (
7         a : in  std_logic;
8         b : in  std_logic;
9         q : out std_logic;
10     );
11 end entity signed_adder;
12
13 architecture signed_adder_arch of signed_adder is
14     signal s : signed(31 downto 0);
15     signal q : std_logic;
16
17     process
18         q <= ('0' & assigned(a)) + ('0' & assigned(b));
19         end q;
20     end process;
21 end signed_adder_arch;
```

A Malware attack will insert execution binaries into each of the 3x cores' program memory on the FPGA.

Synthesis / Implementation



But since the attacker compiled the malware for the publicly-available Baseline computer's opcodes, it is the only one that executes the malware.






**But how do we map the original source code opcode assignments used by the compiler into the two heterogenous cores?**




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
HDL Description of  
3x Computers &  
Attack Detect Voter




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



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


**We want to start the software development using a standard tool flow. (i.e., main.c, standard development environments)**


HDL Description of 3x Computers & Attack Detect Voter



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


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


The disassembly gives us details of which fields in the machine code are Opcodes vs. Operands.

HDL Description of 3x Computers & Attack Detect Voter




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





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
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



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








# Testbed for Demonstration


**Standard Eclipse Programming Environment Supporting C and Assembly.**




**Targeting a widely-used Microcontroller, the MSP430. A 16-bit RISC processor.**





**Testbed program (main.c) to keep a missile upright**















# Testbed for Demonstration


**We built a fully functional MSP430 in VHDL from the TI datasheets.**




## HDL Description of System




**We used Matlab Simulink HDL Coder to generate the VHDL from a graphical/functional description.**




The entire control unit is described as a graph and then converted into VHDL by the HDL coder toolbox.



## HDL Description of System



# Testbed for Demonstration






# Testbed for Demonstration


HDL Description of System




We used the intel Quartus FPGA design tools.




# Testbed for Demonstration





**We used the DE0-CV FPGA board with an intel Cyclone V FPGA.**






## Functionally Equivalent Systems "MSP430 vs. CyberShield"


Both running closed-loop control code to keep missile upright and accepted setpoint angles over UART.

UART for angle setpoint  
(47° or 61° or 79°,

Stepper motor for control

Angle sensor





## Program Description

The computer periodically sends the stepper motor its setpoint angle. The send frequency is dictated by a timer that triggers and interrupt.

The computer continuously reads the actual angle of the missile from the sensor and compares it to the setpoints. It adjusts motor accordingly.

New setpoints are received asynchronously from a user over UART. A Rx on the UART link triggers an IRQ.




## Program Vulnerabilities (Classic Buffer Overflow Attack)

```
while(1){
  for(index=0xFFFF;index!=0;index--){
    _NOP();
  }
  temp = RXBUF[0];
  if(temp == '1'){
    set_angle = 47;
  }else if (temp=='2'){
    set_angle = 79;
  }else{
    set_angle = 61;
  }
  if(rx_index == 1){
    rx_index=0;
  }
  temp = decode_array[P1IN];

  if(temp<set_angle){
    P2OUT &=~(BIT2); //enable stepper motor
    P2OUT |= (BIT1); //set direction
    P2OUT &=~(BIT5); //set direction
    temp = set_angle-temp;
  }else if (temp>set_angle){
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    P2OUT |= (BIT5); //set direction
    temp = temp-set_angle;
  }else{
    P2OUT |= BIT2; //Disable stepper motor
  }
  frequency = 4000 - 63*(temp);
}

#pragma vector = TIMER0_B0_VECTOR;
interrupt void Timer_ISR(){
  TB0CCR0+=frequency;
  P2OUT ^=BIT4;
  //frequency+=1;
  TB0CCTL0 &=~ CCIFG;
  // TB0CCTL0
}

// Service UART
#pragma vector = EUSCI_A1_VECTOR
__interrupt void ISR_EUSCI_A1(void) {
  RXBUF[rx_index++] =UCA1RXBUF;
  UCA1IFG &= ~UCRXIFG;
}
```




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
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    P2OUT &=
    P2OUT |= (B
    temp = tem
  }else{
    P2OUT |= BI
  }
  frequency = 40
}


#pragma vector = TIMER
interrupt void Timer_I
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
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
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
## Program Vulnerabilities (Classic Buffer Overflow Attack)

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while(1){  
  for(index=0xFFFF;index!=0;index--){  
    _NOP();  
  }  
  temp = RXBUF[0];  
  if(temp == '1'){  
    set_angle = 47;  
  }else if (temp=='2'){  
    set_angle = 79;  
  }else{  
    set_angle = 61;  
  }  
  if(rx_index == 1){  
    rx_index=0;  
  }  
  temp = decode_array[P1IN];  
  
  if(temp<set_angle){  
    P2OUT &~(BIT2); //ena  
    P2OUT |= (BIT1); //set d  
    P2OUT &~(BIT5); //set dir  
    temp = set_angle-temp;  
  }else if (temp>set  
    P2OUT &~(B  
    P2OUT &=  
    P2OUT |= (B  
    temp = tem  
  }else{  
    P2OUT |=BI  
  }  
  frequency = 40  
}  
  
#pragma vector = TIMER  
interrupt void Timer_I  
  TB0CCR0+=frequency;  
  P2OUT ^=BIT4;  
  //frequency+=1;  
  TB0CTL0 &~ CEIFG;  
  // TB0CTL0  
}  
  
// Service UART  
#pragma vector = EUSCI_A1_VECTOR  
__interrupt void ISR_EUSCI_A1(void) {  
  RXBUF[rx_index++] =UCA1RXBUF;  
  UCA1IFG &= ~UCRXIFG;  
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```

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
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
#pragma vector = TIMER
interrupt void Timer_I
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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while(1){
  for(index=0xFFFF;index!=0;index--){
    _NOP();
  }
  temp = RXBUF[0];
  if(temp == '1'){
    set_angle = 47;
  }else if (temp=='2'){
    set_angle = 79;
  }else{
    set_angle = 61;
  }
  if(rx_index == 1){
    rx_index=0;
  }
  temp = decode_array[P1IN];

  if(temp<set_angle){
    P2OUT &=~(BIT2); //ena
    P2OUT |= (BIT1); //set d
    P2OUT &=~(BIT5); //set dir
    temp = set_angle-temp;
  }else if (temp>set
    P2OUT &=~(B
    P2OUT &=
    P2OUT |= (B
    temp = tem
  }else{
    P2OUT |=BI
  }
  frequency = 40
}


#pragma vector = TIMER
interrupt void Timer_I
  TB0CCR0+=frequency;
  P2OUT ^=BIT4;
  //frequency+=1;
  TB0CCTL0 &=~ CCIIFG;
  // TB0CCTL0
}

// Service UART
#pragma vector = EUSCI_A1_VECTOR
__interrupt void ISR_EUSCI_A1(void) {
  RXBUF[rx_index++] =UCA1RXBUF;
  UCA1IFG &= ~UCRXIFG;
}
```

2. But the developer introduced a vulnerability by adding a delay loop in the main program to allow the UART to complete before resetting the input buffer size back to 0.

3. This allows the attacker to stream in malicious code and replace the correct ISR return address.

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
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
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
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    P2OUT &=
    P2OUT |= (B
    temp = tem
  }else{
    P2OUT |=BI
  }
  frequency = 40
}


#pragma vector = TIMER
interrupt void Timer_I
  TB0CCR0+=frequency;
  P2OUT ^=BIT4;
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}

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
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## MSP430 Attack – How it looks in data memory...

```

0x002000 decode_array
0x002000 3800 3728 0018 3427 3908 0000 0017 0D24 0078 3629 0000 3500 0007 0000 1314 127D 6968 0000 6A19 0026 3A00 0000 0000 0E25 7677 0000 6800 0000 0004 0003 6C6D 0102
0x002070 7574 0000 0073 0000 5E5D 005C 5F72 0071 4748 4400 0049 1D00 4600 4500 0000 2223 0079 007A 004A 1E00 0006 007B 0000 117C 0000 4300 001A 1C1B 3800 0000 0000 0F00
0x0020E0 3D64 4265 3E00 3100 3C63 2E00 0000 3000 534D 4345 3E4C 4000 5162 504F 6061 0070
0x002100 frequency
0x002100 009D
0x002102 set_angle
0x002102 003D
0x002104 rx_index
0x002104 0001
0x002106 RXBUF
0x002106 8C31
0x002108 index
0x002108 7F97 F680 EDAA E19A 4C9A A300 8D1A 908A 5419 9718 1889 95E2 C430 D690 6D81 84E0 E714 C184 5E99 B1D3 CEB9 A1DA 7A8D 80B0 4B08 90E1 C3CC A150 680A 88C0 16BF E452
0x002178 F6B8 8712 10AF C3E8 7ECC 4FD1 564A 06FF EE0F 8490 5778 92F9 D69F 24C0 EEFB 3670 E25C 8599 5CDA A106 C6A2 2D48 D2DF 2162 C58A 24C4 D59B DB6B F434 FF0E 5F88 888E
0x0021E8 C69F B6C0 FC9C 0105 2054 2ED0 8C9C B1EE EECA 9211 D7F5 F501 44C9 D483 1D88 A06B E6C8 178A FD8F F460 CE91 4680 589C F550 434F F7E0 41D5 224F CA5C E8E4 D0D9 ECE6
0x002258 D517 1529 3A9B C80C CF60 6FE1 DC9D C841 CCDD A2A9 1809 A903 5C1F C7A9 97D3 B041 AE9C A7C9 CCDD A842 C608 C682 C29B DCC0 64E4 1148 EB9D 2CD2 9922 8598 DE97 8A42
0x0022C8 C408 C51C DF99 2481 C269 04A8 89DD 1D40 822E 43AA C1DD 8143 90EF A52A C5BA 0767 0CCB A269 97CB 44CE E54E 0469 12D3 F448 E45A 2180 12DF D04A 8798 E58C 507F D21B
0x002338 F89C 8071 71DB C141 CCD2 24CC D8D9 435B F53F 9889 D6D1 3244 86E7 8189 A491 BC26 CEDD F1C1 72EF 957B D689 0561 618F 9ECA 8698 93C1 499D AAA2 E5F8 C540 5A99 00E3
0x0023A8 C63D 88B8 329B D455 6627 11C1 5A81 8152 4799 11C1 2AF1 2378 E1D0 E5C7 D005 9D70 CA76 6101 F88E C4DA EA88 95F0 4398 8C43 E6AF 9730 5A9B 8D53 6016 D128 C18C B872
0x002418 4812 C38C 74DF B3D0 7609 D7CC 784E DB40 C569 D488 D1DD CC42 C4FD BE89 549D C942 C017 CD93 5474 C162 E66F C4C9 45DC 9362 C788 1563 425F F641 4EF9 428A 71AB BC43
0x002488 85C7 D483 610A 8F6A E04E 0219 D109 C70B E55A 8730 429B 8401 CCD9 81E1 A58B 044A A073 D9C3 9D89 C269 DC28 9421 37DD 20DA C5FA E2D1 79F9 8719 604A C599 43AE E0CA
0x0024F8 F606 A818 121D C848 C442 A750 5B3A CC48 F4D7 6541 3699 2402 E754 1500 519D 704C 935C A251 668F C04B F4D4 70A1 A4FE A842 EE18 26D9 14BA B140 E07F 260B 5919 C44A
0x002568 8193 4109 5D1F D1C8 47D3 A158 7A9B D64A C49C A54A F20B D568 4E08 8582 3183 AE41 4E50 CCA8 79DB C850 D4A9 F1A4 72CF D251 4480 B688 1BEA 4982 D44E 64C4 3BDB 8188
0x0025D8 C6B3 E698 7809 4582 F678 07BC 57AC 2B0E F640 A680 31DC 48B3 C4D9 A581 9452 2377 E031 5005 7399 4144 E293 09C0 850D 22C0 EA93 0329 7EDD 44EE A416 B0A4 7889 565A
0x002648 688E E219 76DF 7C59 62DB C08D 36A1 ABC6 62B9 B145 2A89 2800 B411 1588 2899 7021 C45F 8381 F289 E0B1 A39F D363 3EAF A792 9F42 6890 66C9 C692 E62C C0DD EE72
0x0026B8 4C09 B644 84CB A76C 440D F7E8 DF59 E540 6E18 3CF8 9BFC 8493 6807 35D1 D28B F1C5 28F5 1D9B 5CF3 2D79 E4D8 8F99 2FAB A561 C2F9 80A9 4FAB 81EC A6DA 85C1 52DF 8453
0x002728 57AD FD90 55C9 6D82 561D 8181 B389 A202 C4CB 6587 75D9 81C0 E40E E58F 2ACD 92C1 C19A C9DA 7ADB A4F2 C4A6 958A CA89 F440 470A A582 129C C6D1 96DF A08D 17B9 9CC4
0x002798 2B0E C580 0289 8C52 C618 85A0 58AB A0C3 C8BE 02F0 6E59 9183 F4EF C4D8 FE99 D8C2 ED08 E488 1883 8742 EC48 9581 7097 8454 EE3B 9580 5AD3 8717 A61B 95A0 1A9B E449
0x002808 53AB 9E3A CC56 A284 8361 D6F9 AEF2 A025 0178 D679 5999 9116 0677 DD2B DD2E EF6C AB07 2180 B462 A848 4FF3 B98C 5AAB DC0A 8427 AE45 F444 DD26 331D F09D 1E68 E922
0x002878 E93D 80CA 58E8 1944 18AF A323 74C6 F7E4 3D1D 290F 2F04 E0E4 06FF A319 A1E5 3FE4 5E57 EA2E E069 36A6 0963 D872 BBFC FD62 9727 1722 2C48 2DC6 49AF CD2D 3C7D 3607
0x0028E8 38AB 887E 41C6 B881 292A FB28 668E 2804 C991 8B0D 354A 3CC0 4E0A 92EF B4EA 7C27 984F 9967 BC66 5822 7DCF DB61 E4E8 9500 E7E4 1B25 A1CD 8202 B877 FF6C B5CC 9438
0x002958 5257 BBAE 73F4 A018 E0A7 3D3E 498A 1822 E16F 373F 6DAA B439 933A 4D4F 78AC 6543 FDBF 5BA6 ED8D A421 79E7 BC88 7E8F DDEB 2A0F 2F76 1086 A56C 803F 7337 80A2 852D
0x0029C8 523B F0A3 B39B 25EE 280F D951 4860 A806 1D35 CA08 D0CB 14B1 0095 4A9A 1EF8 F429 2867 930B 68E8 A010 2526 ACE3 6EF9 3C2A 2A17 B234 2499 8558 2986 5AAA 20F5 EC08
0x002A38 375F B823 A032 210C 918E 566E FECS 9C80 BC65 D336 2B0B A1EB B225 D280 B2B5 CE15 211F E652 D678 F71C 316B B930 1D3B BEC4 3EB7 7938 04EA 39E7 E237 9879 9729 BC76
0x002AA8 21A5 C579 ECE3 8C02 59E7 D319 0887 7456 0505 D73F D8BE 900C 063F 9626 048E 9848 8ACD 1F21 729F F54C B48B 5F38 DCF3 7B32 25AD 397E 14E3 34D0 8B1D BA2E 01F9 AC26
0x002B18 13F7 A108 AEC6 E47A 2662 CA03 4EB1 B400 042D 5639 5CBE AC0E 22B5 892F 0FFE 5A4C 6A0D B935 51CE 2F6E 21A9 CBA7 6DC4 9E47 202E 4F39 6ED4 EB45 892C 776D FEDB 7854
0x002B88 3A9D BC2E 30E4 FAED 403A D063 8870 1206 2128 712B CB6B FB61 0407 937B 6549 A737 D037 7A04 C7B1 CE0C 8723 3F22 2AF2 8C04 4EB7 6200 2FC8 9E06 8727 F25C 6FEA DA3C
0x002BF8 08A2 1B28 05E5 4A21 D7F0 FF1C EDAS 80E9 D819 D807 6C9A 8A23 09EF 235F 7FDD 4E27 9899 8208 DC00 4F08 DF85 AB46 16B2 E328 143F 59A3 1E22 BC1C 43A6 98E9 B9B3 5D60
0x002C68 02F9 F010 C44C A504 CF0F B1C9 E413 E006 A4B5 F429 ED56 6826 A7BC B827 FC4C E220 7EE4 D86B E8BC E2E3 5D77 CF56 D428 3887 86E3 D376 E06C BDA3 0307 A42A B6EC B823
0x002CD8 2E61 FB12 660C 2204 06A5 143A B230 268C 53C5 7725 A5B5 2696 94B7 B229 0CED A3AD 5952 F32A 65C5 9240 BE1D 9178 05E9 B6A8 8CEF EB30 0DE5 3684 EDD7 E3B1 A4E9 B40C
0x002D48 4828 BE33 0F09 161F C939 9EA1 1F46 9C6C 162C 0205 8C8A E428 90F9 9AB2 F68C 0564 04B3 332A 7CEE 204C 0F6F B3E0 1C9A C408 B181 FC37 EC86 BF50 32C3 991D 3BDA BD72
0x002DB8 62E4 B279 FDED F87E BE70 FB4D 7048 E888 6679 39EA 1844 60A0 8F7B 2158 748A 6E05 94F0 AB38 05AA 4080 05B8 93FA 50DD CA04 1FF1 3324 C54D EB44 BE7B B09C DD87 CE05
0x002E28 A66F E78A 3F39 F01D A527 893A 3BAA E836 FAD7 58BE 96F0 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000
0x002E98 96FD FE20 7099 ECD8 E503 CB21 7488 F848 1337 4970 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000
0x002F08 4CA2 C192 88D7 F2E9 85BC 48A0 FDC0 3826 32B7 9F33 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000
0x002F78 4C06 586D B91B BC04
0x002F80 _stack
0x002F80 FDA3 BA67 FADE CC97 196E 606F 655E 1E96 1E96 1E96 1E96 1E96 1E96 1E96 1E96 1E96 1E96 1E96 1E96 1E96 1E96 1E96 1E96 1E96 1E96 1E96 1E96 1E96 1E96 1E96 1E96
0x002FF0 824A 0000 810A 003D 009D 0000 8176 0072 3FFF 3FFF 3FFF 3FFF 3FFF 3FFF 3FFF 3FFF 3FFF 3FFF 3FFF 3FFF 3FFF 3FFF 3FFF 3FFF 3FFF 3FFF 3FFF 3FFF 3FFF 3FFF 3FFF
0x003060 3FFF 3FFF 3FFF 3FFF 3FFF 3FFF 3FFF 3FFF 3FFF 3FFF 3FFF 3FFF 3FFF 3FFF 3FFF 3FFF 3FFF 3FFF 3FFF 3FFF 3FFF 3FFF 3FFF 3FFF 3FFF 3FFF 3FFF 3FFF 3FFF 3FFF 3FFF

```

The vulnerability

What the attacker is after




UART ISR Return Address








## The Same Attack is Made on CyberShield





The Malware Still Gets Inserted via Buffer Overflow





## The Same Attack is Made on CyberShield









The Malware Still Gets Inserted via Buffer Overflow

But as soon as the starts reading the inserted code in the CPU, it detects that all opcodes are the same!!!

## The Same Attack is Made on CyberShield

We can see how CyberShield Responds by Measuring the Instruction Registers in the CPU with a Logic Analyzer.

All Opcodes are Different by Design

+ Lowlife			h0	h2	hF	h2	h7	h0	hF	h2	h7	h0
+ Baseline			h0	h4	h1	h4	h9	h2	h1	h4	h9	h2
+ Highroller			h0	h6	h3	h6	hB	h4	h3	h6	hB	h4



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+ Highroller		h0	h6	h3	h6	hB	h4	h3	h6	hB	h4

The attack is detected when all three CPUs see the same Opcode.

CyberShield Halts Operation and Initiates a Recovery Procedure.

+ Lowlife		h7	h0	hB	h5	h0
+ Baseline		h9	h2	hD	h5	h0
+ Highroller		hB	h4	hF	h5	h0



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+ Lowlife	h0	h2	hF	h2	h7	h0	hF	h2	h7	h0
+ Baseline	h0	h4	h1	h4	h9	h2	h1	h4	h9	h2
+ Highroller	h0	h6	h3	h6	hB	h4	h3	h6	hB	h4

The attack is detected when all three CPUs see the same Opcode.

CyberShield Halts Operation and Initiates a Recovery Procedure.

+ Lowlife	h7	h0	hB	h5	h0
+ Baseline	h9	h2	hD	h5	h0
+ Highroller	hB	h4	hF	h5	h0

After flushing out the malware, CyberShield resumes normal operation.

The rapid nature of hardware recovery allows low latency and the ability to operate-through-attack.

+ Lowlife	h0	h2	hF	h2	h7	h0	hF	h2	h7	h0	h2
+ Baseline	h0	h4	h1	h4	h9	h2	h1	h4	h9	h2	h4
+ Highroller	h0	h6	h3	h6	hB	h4	h3	h6	hB	h4	h6



- CyberShield is an approach to defeating malware by introducing hardware diversity at the hardware level.
- This is enabled by real-time HDL generation at compile-time.
- A buffer insertion attack was used to test CyberShield.
- CyberShield was able to detect the malware, remove it, and continue operation while an MCU was not.



# Questions

